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Abstract 
I argue that judgements of what is ‘true in a fiction’ presuppose the Reality Assumption: the 
assumption that everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the 
work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a 
rule for inferring implied content from what is explicit. Instead it provides an array of real-
world truths that can be used in such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is 
essential to our ability to understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence that 
demonstrates our reliance on it in narrative comprehension. However, the Reality Assumption 
has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes 
countless facts that neither authors nor readers could (or should) ever consider. I argue that 
such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption. I conclude that we 
should take fictions, like non-fictions, to be about the real world. 
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1. Introduction 
Readers of fiction are adept at understanding what is ‘fictionally true’ even though this goes 
well beyond what the text makes explicit. We know that Candide has blood in his veins rather 
than oatmeal and that Sethe cannot become invisible at will, although the relevant works 
never say so. We also recognize fictional truths that contradict the explicit text. We know that 
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Huck Finn is right to help the slave Jim escape and that Lolita is not Humbert Humbert’s 
willing partner, despite the narrators’ statements to the contrary. These observations pose a 
puzzle. How do we draw and justify conclusions about what is true in the fiction? 
Philosophers have answered this question by postulating principles of generation [Walton 
1990], rules for making inferences from what is explicit to what is fictionally the case. 
In this paper I do not defend a new principle. Rather, I claim that any such principle 
presupposes the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) true is 
also fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work.
1
 The Reality Assumption has several 
surprising consequences, such as that the fictional truths go far beyond what authors or 
readers could know. Yet if we did not take this assumption as a starting point for 
interpretation, we would fail to understand even the most basic stories. In what follows I 
explain and defend the Reality Assumption, distinguishing it from the more familiar Reality 
Principle. I then reply to objections. I conclude that given the fundamental role of the Reality 
Assumption, we should construe fictions as inviting us to imagine about the real world. 
 
2. Truth in Fiction 
I begin by sketching the conception of fictional truth assumed in the rest of the paper. 
Intuitively, what is fictionally true is whatever obtains in the ‘world of the story’. Some 
philosophers take the intuition literally, spelling out fictional truth as truth at a set of possible 
worlds (most famously Lewis [1983]). This approach faces numerous challenges. In 
particular, by contrast with possible worlds, fictional worlds are typically incomplete—
leaving many features indeterminate—and often impossible [Woodward 2011]. Perhaps these 
worries can be addressed. However, I prefer a functional account along the lines proposed by 
                                                 
1
 This is similar to Evans’s [1982: 354] incorporation principle for pretence. Lewis [1983: 269] articulates the 
same idea but goes on to defend the Reality Principle. 
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Kendall Walton [1990], for whom what is fictionally true, or simply fictional, is what a work 
of fiction prescribes that readers imagine.
2
 This analysis is silent as to whether the content to 
be imagined should be specified by possible worlds or in some other way, focusing instead on 
the role of fictional truth in our engagement with stories.  
Although prescriptions to imagine are sometimes associated with mandates, we need 
not imagine everything that is fictional. If we want to understand a work, some kinds of 
imagining are required. One could not grasp the basic plot of Gulliver’s Travels without 
imagining Gulliver travelling to Lilliput, Brobdingnag, and so forth. A fuller appreciation 
demands recognizing how mistaken Gulliver is about himself (something children often 
miss). Still, even a full appreciation does not require imagining that Gulliver has internal 
organs, though it is surely fictional that he does. It is helpful to distinguish these obligations. I 
will say that a work mandates imagining that P if failure to imagine that P would mean 
falling below a minimum threshold for comprehension. A work prescribes imagining that P if 
we should imagine that P to have a full appreciation of the story. Finally, a work invites 
imagining that P on the following condition: if the question arises and we must choose 
between imagining that P and imagining that not-P, we are required to imagine the former.
3
 
What is fictional in a work is what the work invites imagining. Although we need never 
imagine that Gulliver has internal organs, if the question came up it would be absurd to deny 
that he does.  
At the same time we may, compatibly with the content of a story, imagine a great deal 
that is not fictional. I might imagine Gulliver with brown eyes and you might imagine him 
with blue, and someone else might not imagine his eye colour at all. That Gulliver’s eyes are 
                                                 
2
 Walton [2015] has recently argued that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fictionality. I believe 
that sufficient conditions can be given (see Woodward [2014: 830–2]). These details are irrelevant here. 
3
 This is Walton’s [1990: 40] most careful formulation. Note that where fictions prescribe inconsistent 
imaginings we should not choose between P and not-P; we are invited imagine both (whether or not we are 
able).  
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blue is not fictional, because if the question arose, we would be obligated to imagine neither 
that his eyes are blue nor that they are not. Given that (as far as I know) Swift leaves 
Gulliver’s eye colour indeterminate, we are authorized or permitted to fill in this aspect of the 
fictional world as we desire.
4
 In short, we are invited to imagine a great deal more than we 
should imagine for full understanding or must imagine for minimal understanding, but less 
than we are permitted to imagine. 
Walton says little about the nature of the imagining invited by works of fiction. At a 
minimum, imagining that P requires forming a mental representation with the content P. 
When we read a story, though, we do not simply imagine a series of propositions. Instead, we 
imagine a world.
5
 In particular, we construct a complex mental representation of what the 
story is about: the individuals, settings, situations, and events the work portrays. 
Psychologists call this a situation model [van Dijk and Kintsch 1983] or mental model 
[Johnson-Laird 1983]. It is a ‘mental microworld of what the story is about’, constructed by 
making inferences, usually automatically and subconsciously, from the explicit text, using 
prior knowledge to develop and update a coherent representation of the individuals and 
events described [Graesser, Olde, and Klettke 2002: 234]. Psychologists postulate situation 
models to explain readers’ capacity to understand stories, and they deploy this concept in 
explaining how readers are ‘transported’ to narrative worlds [Gerrig 1993] or take the ‘mental 
leap’ into imagined worlds [Zwaan 1999].  
Now, psychologists do not restrict themselves to fiction; they deploy these 
representations to explain comprehension of stories more generally. In my view non-fiction 
narratives invite us to imagine ‘worlds’ just as much as fictions do [Friend 2008:155–6]. For 
present purposes, though, it is the content that is mentally represented which matters, rather 
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 Thanks to Manuel García-Carpintero and members of the PhD seminar at the University of Barcelona for 
discussion of these different conditional obligations. 
5
 In this respect we engage not only in propositional but also in objectual imagining [Yablo 1993]. 
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than the attitude we take toward it.
6
 Non-fiction stories clearly invite readers to form mental 
representations of what they are about. If what is fictional is what is so according to a work of 
fiction, this should not differ in kind from what is so according to a work of non-fiction. The 
point is obvious when we take the non-fiction to be inaccurate: the most hardened atheist 
recognizes that according to Augustine’s Confessions, God exists. Even with accurate works 
we assume a comparison between what is so according to the story and what is actually so, 
indicating that we have an independent grasp on the former [Currie 2010: 74]. I will say that 
what is the case according to a story, whether fiction or non-fiction, is storified. From this 
perspective, the ‘fictional truths’ are just the storified propositions associated with works of 
fiction.
7
 
In what follows I assume that works of fiction invite us to imagine what is storified, in 
the sense of mentally representing it as part of an imagined storyworld. So we can 
reformulate the Reality Assumption as follows: everything that is true or obtains in the real 
world is storified—that is, we are invited to imagine it as part of the storyworld—unless it is 
excluded by the work.
8
 In the rest of the paper I defend the Reality Assumption. In the next 
section I distinguish it from the Reality Principle.  
 
3. The Reality Assumption and the Reality Principle 
The motivation behind the Reality Assumption is what Marie-Laure Ryan [1980] calls the 
principle of minimal departure: that storyworlds remain as close to the actual world as 
possible. That is how we know that Sethe lacks superpowers (despite other supernatural 
elements in Beloved), that Huck Finn does the right thing, that Humbert Humbert is deceptive 
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 Matravers [2014] agrees that both fiction and non-fiction invite readers to construct situation models, but 
denies that this involves imagining. The dispute is unimportant here. 
7
 The same applies to non-narrative works that intuitively generate ‘imagined worlds’, although for these cases 
the term storified is less apt. 
8
 This formulation allows for non-propositional content, if any, to be storified.  
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or delusional. The Reality Assumption captures this intuition by instructing us to take for 
granted that everything that obtains in reality is storified, adjusting this presumption only as 
needed.  
The most familiar reason for adjustment is explicit, reliable content that contradicts 
reality. The opening line of Austen’s Emma mentions a certain Emma Woodhouse, who is 
‘handsome, clever, and rich’, inviting us to include a representation of Emma in the imagined 
storyworld. Since Emma never actually existed, this means departing from the ontology of 
the real world. Still, because Emma is human, we take for granted that she is like real human 
beings in having arms and legs, relationships with other people, and so forth. Other works 
demands more radical departures. The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy is populated by 
numerous aliens, outlandish events, and fantastic technologies. Still, we take Adams to be 
providing a fanciful vision of the real universe, so that we can assume that whatever aspects 
of reality remain consistent with other story-truths are themselves storified and draw 
inferences accordingly. The Reality Assumption does not tell us how to make such 
inferences. Instead, it supplies an array of story-truths—that human beings have arms and 
legs and so on—which, in combination with other storified content, can form the basis of 
inferences to further story-truths. 
How we make and justify these inferences is one focus of standard accounts of truth 
in fiction. These accounts typically assume that the explicit text directly generates certain 
story-truths from which others may be inferred. The challenge is then specifying principles or 
rules that underpin inferences from the former—call these the primary story-truths—to the 
latter, or implied story-truths [Walton 1990: 142]. Now, there are good reasons to doubt that 
any story-truths are directly generated by the explicit content of a work, the most obvious of 
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which is the possibility of unreliable narration.
9
 My own view is that we take as a defeasible 
presumption that some sentences of a text are constitutive of what is storified, adjusting this 
presumption where we detect unreliability.
10
 But what matters for present purposes is that 
accounts of fictional truth identify some set of basic story-truths from which others are 
generated. Then they ask which principles justify the inferences from the one to the other.  
Motivated by the same considerations behind the Reality Assumption, many theorists 
have suggested some version of what Walton [1990: 144] dubs the Reality Principle. Here is 
one: 
 
(RP)  If p1, …, pn are the primary story-truths, q is storified—that is, we are invited to 
imagine that q—if and only if, were it the case that p1, …, pn, it would be the case that 
q.
11
  
 
The idea is that we hold the primary story-truths fixed and ask what the real world would be 
like if they obtained. The implied story-truths are those that would also obtain in those 
circumstances. The counterfactual conditional is interpreted to mean that a possible world in 
which both the primary story-truths and q are true is closer to the actual world than one in 
which primary story-truths are true and q is false [ibid.: 145]. This is how the Reality 
Principle conforms to the principle of minimal departure.  
It is widely recognized that the Reality Principle, formulated as RP, cannot be a 
universal inference rule for implied story-truths. One problem is that it treats primary story-
truths as the only reason for departures from reality. Genre considerations may provide 
                                                 
9
 See Walton [1990: 170–174] for an array of other reasons.  
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 Story-truths can be directly generated by other features of the work as well; for instance, we may take the 
classification as a ghost story to establish directly (but defeasibly) the fictional existence of ghosts.  
11
 This version of the Reality Principle is adapted from Walton’s [1990: 145]. Other classic formulations are in 
Lewis [1983], Ryan [1980], and Wolterstorff [1980].  
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another reason. If in a fantasy story about knights a dragon appears, we are invited to imagine 
that the dragon breathes fire unless otherwise indicated, even if a world without fire-breathing 
creatures is closer to the actual world than one with [Lewis 1983: 274]. It is a convention of 
traditional zombie movies that zombies cannot run, but questions about the ambulatory 
capacities of the undead are not answerable by appeal to the Reality Principle [Woodward 
2011: 163]. In other cases we may need to be familiar with the beliefs of the author and the 
original audience. It might be impossible to understand an ancient religious text without 
imagining various supernatural phenomena. Different interpretive strategies can also licence 
distinct readings of the same text. Henry James intended The Turn of the Screw as a ghost 
story about demonic possession, but an influential Freudian interpretation treats the novella 
as the deluded account of a sexually repressed narrator. Because a world in which human 
beings are delusional is more realistic than one in which there are ghosts, the Reality 
Principle seems to restrict us to the Freudian interpretation. 
To address this worry, we might revise our formulation of the Reality Principle along 
the following lines: 
 
(RP*)  If p1, …, pn are the primary story-truths, q is storified—that is, we are invited to 
imagine that q—if, were it the case that p1, …, pn, it would be the case that q, except if 
relevant interpretive considerations indicate otherwise.  
 
A concern here is that all sorts of considerations may justify departures from reality, 
undermining the sense in which closeness to the real world constrains interpretation. Perhaps 
a specification of which considerations count as relevant could be tightened up. Even so, this 
would not be sufficient to meet a different challenge.  
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The counterfactual formulation of both RP and RP* requires us to consider what 
would be true if the primary story-truths obtained. Although we must stay as close to reality 
as possible, adjustments are inevitable. When Chinua Achebe plants the fictional village of 
Umuofia west of the real city Onitsha in Things Fall Apart, he alters the geography of 
Nigeria. The potential ramifications—what else would be true if there were a Umuofia, with 
all of its inhabitants, relations with other villages, and so on—are left open, since many 
variations will be equally close to the actual world. More fantastic stories demand more 
significant adjustments. According to Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, the earth is a 
supercomputer created by intelligent mice and an infinite improbability drive allows travel 
faster than light by passing through every point in every universe simultaneously. Given these 
primary story-truths, so much would be so radically different from reality that it would seem 
rash to explain Arthur Dent’s reactions to events by appeal to familiar features of human 
psychology.
12
 Even more rash is the assumption that the behaviour of aliens can be explained 
in similar terms; yet the novel would be incomprehensible if we did not make this 
assumption. Our ordinary understanding does not seem to be justified by The Reality 
Principle.   
Challenges to the Reality Principle usually lead philosophers to formulate alternative 
principles of generation. For instance, they propose that we draw inferences from the primary 
story-truths consistently with the beliefs prevalent in the author’s community, or that we rely 
on assumptions about what a plausibly reconstructed author would intend (see sections 4–5). 
There are many problems with this strategy, of which I note two. First, it is unlikely that any 
general principle could determine what is storified for every fiction. Our interpretive 
practices are too unsystematic to be captured by a single, finitely characterized rule [Walton 
1990: ch. 4]. A more rational conclusion is just that the Reality Principle works in some cases 
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but not others. Second, in adopting alternative principles theorists reject not only the Reality 
Principle but also its motivation. In consequence they reject the Reality Assumption. This is a 
mistake.  
The reasons so far given for questioning the Reality Principle do not apply to the 
Reality Assumption.
13
 The Reality Assumption is not a mechanism for generating implied 
story-truths; it is a starting point for specifying the input into any such mechanism. According 
to the Reality Assumption, facts about the real world are storified not as a consequence of 
determining what follows from the primary story-truths, but by default. We are, from the 
start, invited to represent as part of the storyworld anything that obtains in the real world that 
does not contradict other features of the work. Importantly, any rejections will be localized. 
That we exclude truths about planetary development or space travel in Hitchhiker’s Guide 
need not have implications for psychological explanation. We default to the assumption that 
familiar behaviour can be explained in the ordinary way, and we do not give that assumption 
up unless required to do so. In this way the Reality Assumption articulates a bias in favour of 
reality. It does not determine the interpretation of a work, for multiple interpretations could 
be consistent with both the Reality Assumption and the primary story-truths. We should not 
expect a philosophical account to deliver the answer to every interpretive question.  
Nonetheless, the Reality Assumption provides a robust starting point for 
interpretation, directing us to take the real world as background when making inferences to 
what else is storified. I claim that by contrast with the Reality Principle, the Reality 
Assumption applies universally. In the next section I provide evidence for the essential role 
of the Reality Assumption, and in the following sections I consider objections. I argue that 
the criticisms misconstrue the Reality Assumption as one among other possible ways of 
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 Other objections to the Reality Principle do apply to the Reality Assumption (see sections 4–5). 
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providing a story’s background. Rather, it specifies a comprehensive, default position for 
which there is no alternative. 
 
4. Evidence for the Reality Assumption 
There is ample empirical evidence that our comprehension of stories relies on the Reality 
Assumption. The activation of prior knowledge, including knowledge of ordinary facts about 
the world, is essential to basic comprehension, underpinning inferences that go beyond or 
contradict explicit content. Inferences based on prior knowledge are largely ‘bottom-up’ and 
non-strategic: prior knowledge is automatically activated as we read (see Kintsch [1998: 227–
38]). In this sense readers take the Reality Assumption as a default.  
To illustrate, consider inferences concerning characters’ emotions. Gernsbacher, 
Goldsmith, and Robertson [1992] had participants read a series of stories. In one, Tom visits 
the shop where his friend Joe works, then steals money from the till. Later Tom learns that 
Joe was fired because of the missing money. The researchers wanted to know if readers 
would automatically represent the implied emotional state. After reading the story, 
participants read a further sentence, one version of ‘It would be weeks before Tom’s 
guilt/pride/shyness would subside’. In two experiments, participants read the target sentence 
more quickly when the word matched the implied emotion (guilt) than when it did not. To 
rule out the possibility that readers inferred the emotional state only when they read the target 
sentence rather than while reading, a third experiment had participants read the original 
stories without the target sentences. They were then asked to pronounce a printed word as fast 
as they could. Although pronunciation is a cognitive task unrelated to comprehension, 
participants were systematically slower in pronouncing target words that mismatched the 
implied emotion than those that matched. Their prior knowledge had already been activated.  
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Haenggi, Gernsbacher, and Bolliger [1994] replicated the results of the first two 
experiments for both emotional and spatial inferences. Significantly, they found that readers 
with low and high comprehension skills, or with greater and lesser empathic tendencies or 
spatial imagery ability, exhibited the same pattern of responses. The researchers concluded 
that making online inferences about emotion or location ‘is a relatively effortless process that 
is rather driven by familiar knowledge about emotional states and spatial relations than by 
cognitive abilities’ [ibid.: 93]. In other words, we rely on the Reality Assumption 
automatically and unreflectively in the ordinary course of reading. Notice that this is so 
regardless of the mechanism for generating implied content. We would draw the same 
conclusion about Tom’s emotional state deploying the Reality Principle as we would if we 
were trying to determine what the (fictional or implied) author believed or intended us to 
infer; but only so long as we began with our ordinary knowledge of human emotion.  
A different study focuses on real-world truths independently of inference. Weisberg 
and Goodstein [2009] had participants read three short stories, ranging from wholly realistic 
to very unrealistic. The participants then judged whether a series of true statements that ‘were 
not mentioned in any of the stories and had no bearing on any of the events or characters in 
the stories’ also obtained in the storyworlds [ibid.: 72]. The statements reported facts about 
mathematics (‘2+2=4’), science (‘People have hearts’), social conventions (‘It is rude to pick 
one’s nose’), and contingent reality (‘Washington, D.C., is the capital of the United States’). 
Overall, the more realistic the story and the less contingent the fact, the more likely 
participants judged it as storified. Participants took approximately three quarters of the 
mathematical and scientific truths to obtain in the realistic storyworld. For the other stories 
mathematical facts were judged storified at the same rate, whereas only around half of 
scientific facts were judged storified. Even in the least realistic story readers judged as 
storified over a quarter of the conventional facts. In other words, the participants consistently 
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assumed that some real-world facts obtained in fiction, although they were sensitive to the 
kind of fact and the realism of the story.  
If the Reality Assumption constitutes a starting point for interpretation, the more a 
story requires us to reject real-world assumptions, the harder it should be to comprehend. And 
this is what we find. Graesser, Kassler, Kreuz, and McLain-Allen [1998] had participants 
read chapters from Alan Lightman’s novel Einstein’s Dreams. In each chapter the scientist 
dreams about a village in which time operates differently than in reality: in a circle, 
backwards, standing still, and so on. Participants were asked to rate the story-truth of a series 
of statements, including inferences from the explicit content. Most readers were accurate in 
drawing inferences consistent with real-world assumptions about time. But only readers who 
possessed ‘literary expertise’ (training with literature) had any success in verifying the story-
truth of inferences relying on atypical conceptions of time. The accuracy of readers with low 
literary expertise did not differ significantly from chance. The Reality Assumption explains 
these results. 
So far we have good reason to recognize the Reality Assumption as the default 
starting point for interpretation. The empirical evidence shows that our ability to make 
inferences that take the real world as background is essential to our capacity to understand 
what we read. Even when we exclude certain real-world facts, we still take for granted that 
others are storified.  
Critics may retort that this is merely a descriptive claim. The fact that we do rely on 
the Reality Assumption does not entail that we should. Perhaps readers are systematically 
mistaken in deploying the Reality Assumption. But such an error theory is implausible.
14
 The 
basic skill of understanding stories is not exclusive to the erudite; it is common among 
children as well as across cultures. Moreover, reliance on the Reality Assumption is effective 
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precisely because authors expect readers to take the real world as background. If one goal of 
interpretation is understanding why authors have written what they have, ignoring the Reality 
Assumption would mean failing the meet that goal. So we would need excellent reasons to 
give it up.  
A number of critics have put forward such reasons in arguments against the Reality 
Principle. If their objections are successful, perhaps we must adopt an alternative starting 
point for interpretation. In the final two sections I consider these objections, reformulated to 
target the Reality Assumption.  
 
5. Alternative Backgrounds 
According to the Reality Assumption, we take the real world to provide the background to 
every story. Critics object that this approach treats every story as realistic. As noted above, 
primary story-truths are not the only reason to depart from the Reality Assumption; genre 
conventions and other considerations are also relevant. Perhaps prior to knowing the genre of 
a work we ought to assume that anything at all might be storified. Only for realistic texts 
should we assume that the backdrop of the story is the real world [Matravers 2014: 85–6].  
Genre conventions do underpin departures from reality, but they are too limited in 
scope to generate most of what is storified. Even in fantasies where mythical creatures 
abound, facts about people, rocks, and trees typically remain the same. In the Grimms’ fairy 
tale ‘The Frog Prince’, a talking frog exacts a promise from a princess to love him in 
exchange for his rescuing her most prized possession from the bottom of his well. The 
princess promises, then runs off. The text is silent on why the princess cannot retrieve the 
golden ball herself but the frog can. It is silent on the princess’s motivation for attempting to 
escape the frog. But the reader has no trouble drawing the relevant inferences, relying on 
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real-world knowledge. Or consider the following passage from Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? Rick Deckard has been arguing with his wife about her spending: 
 
He rose, strode to the console of his mood organ. “Instead of saving,” he said, “so we 
could buy a real sheep, to replace that fake electric one upstairs. A mere electric 
animal and me earning all that I’ve worked my way up to through the years.” At his 
console he hesitated between dialing for a thalamic suppressant (which would abolish 
his mood of rage) or a thalamic stimulant (which would make him irked enough to 
win the argument). [Dick 1968: 4] 
 
A few pages into the novel, the reader cannot yet understand how people control their moods 
with a console or why they would have electric sheep. However, she can already infer that a 
real sheep is more valuable, and she can understand Deckard’s anger and the temptation of 
each of the possible moods. These inferences rely on the background supplied by the Reality 
Assumption. Because the Reality Assumption fills in the gaps left open by genre conventions, 
such conventions cannot replace it. 
A different objection is that the Reality Assumption divorces a story from its 
originating context. Suppose that in a society where everyone believes that the earth is flat, 
someone tells a story that ends with a ship’s sailing beyond the horizon [Walton 1990: 151]. 
Nothing in the story specifies the fate of the ship or the shape of the earth. If we take the 
Reality Assumption as our starting point, it seems we should take it as storified that the earth 
is round and infer that the ship sails safely on. Yet the original audience would have 
concluded otherwise.
15
 Perhaps our default position should be not that the background is the 
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Other formulations of the same principle are in Wolterstorff [1980] and Lewis [1983]. 
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real world as we take it to be, but as the author and intended audience took it to be. Such 
considerations might motivate an alternative to the Reality Assumption, the Mutual Belief 
Assumption, according to which we are invited to imagine the content of any of the mutual 
beliefs of the author’s society not excluded by features of the work.  
In fact the Mutual Belief Assumption cannot replace the Reality Assumption in 
providing the background to a story. First, restricting ourselves to a set of beliefs leaves too 
many aspects of the storyworld indeterminate.
16
 Suppose that I read Hilary Mantel’s Wolf 
Hall, lacking detailed knowledge of the Tudor period. Characters make reference to events of 
which I am ignorant and I want to fill in the gaps. The Reality Assumption directs me to find 
out what actually happened. According to the Mutual Belief Assumption, I should instead 
poll the citizenry. Since most readers have relatively few beliefs about the history, the latter 
strategy will leave large gaps. Even for fictions that presuppose very different worldviews—
for instance the Christian worldview of medieval and Renaissance poetry—ordinary details 
could not be filled in without reliance on the Reality Assumption.  
Second, adopting the Mutual Belief Assumption would systematically generate 
incorrect story-truths. In works produced in some societies, it would be storified that there are 
ghosts and fairies, that mental illness is caused by demonic possession, or that comets are 
omens of catastrophe sent by the gods—even if the stories in question suggested no position 
on these matters. More disturbing, many works would generate storyworlds in which slavery 
is just, women are inferior to men, or tyranny is the best form of government [Walton 1990: 
154]. We might be willing to treat such claims as storified when they are explicit or essential 
to understanding the plot, but the Mutual Belief Assumption suggests that a society’s belief 
system is sufficient to generate these story-truths by itself.  
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It is more plausible that we draw on information about societal beliefs only when 
some aspect of a story cannot adequately be understood without it. This is how we read non-
fiction written long ago or far away. Sometimes our ignorance of the author’s context 
prevents us from understanding her representation of the world, although we take for granted 
that the work is about the same reality we inhabit. To construct an appropriate representation 
of the storyworld, we might need to reject real-world truths for some aspects of the story. But 
such rejection will be localized. And given the Reality Assumption, we resist abandoning the 
truth unless we must do so to understand or appreciate a story.  
 
6. Irrelevant Story-Truths 
Perhaps the most compelling objection to the Reality Assumption is that it storifies a glut of 
irrelevancies. It will be storified in Voltaire’s Candide that there was a major California 
earthquake in 1906, that the Higgs boson is responsible for all of the mass in the universe, 
and that I cannot do without my morning coffee. Indeed every story will include vast 
collections of remote facts immaterial to the narrative. Not only will these be unknown to the 
author, many will remain unknown to any potential audience. It follows that storyworlds will 
be determinate in surprising respects. If it is true that Emma Hamilton had exactly N hairs on 
her head and no feature of a narrative contradicts this—as would be the case, for example, in 
any narrative that never mentions Hamilton—then it is storified in that narrative that she had 
exactly N hairs on her head. This result seems to conflict with the intuitive incompleteness of 
storyworlds (see section 1).
17
  
These consequences do not undermine the Reality Assumption. First, adopting the 
Reality Assumption does not entail that stories are determinate in every respect. It is storified 
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in Gulliver’s Travels that Gulliver’s eyes are either blue or not blue; but because the text is 
silent on the issue, we are invited to imagine neither disjunct. This does not imply any kind of 
metaphysical incompleteness. Rather, it indicates a limit on how much a representation can 
specify that we imagine. The Reality Assumption supplements the story, but does not fill 
every gap.  
Second, story-truth entails an invitation to imagine, not an obligation. Readers cannot 
imagine everything that is storified: given limitations on working memory capacity, they 
cannot consider all aspects of the storyworld.
18
 Nor should they. A reader who attempted to 
represent every story-truth would fail to understand the story altogether. Good readers pay 
attention to what is important, remembering the details and making the inferences that 
increase comprehension. Still, if the question came up and we had to decide between 
imagining that the Higgs boson is responsible for mass in Candide and imagining that it is 
not, we should imagine the former. The alternative would imply that Candide is a kind of 
science fiction in which basic laws of physics fail to operate. Nothing of such serious weight 
is likely to turn on Emma Hamilton’s hirsuteness. At the same time, it is hard to see what 
would motivate us to deny that she had precisely the number of hairs on her head that she did 
have, or to insist that it was indeterminate, if the question came up. In practice such questions 
rarely arise, nor should they. Rather than excluding irrelevant story-truths we simply ignore 
them, treating them as background and focusing instead on those story-truths that are relevant 
to appreciation [Walton 1990: 148]. Why certain story-truths and not others count as relevant 
is an issue to which I return below.  
It must be conceded that reports of story content typically exclude backgrounded 
information. One is unlikely to say, ‘In Candide, San Francisco had an earthquake in 1906’. 
                                                 
18
 See McNamara and Magliano [2009] for an overview of factors influencing the inferences readers actually 
make. 
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It would, though, be equally odd to declare that the Higgs boson gives particles mass in 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Yet we do not doubt that the events and 
individuals in his history obey the laws of physics. That readers make the same assumption 
for fiction is borne out by the Weisberg and Goodstein experiment discussed above. 
Participants had little trouble making discriminating judgements concerning the story-truth of 
statements that were entirely irrelevant to the narratives, including mathematical and 
scientific truths.  
These story-truths are unlikely to enhance our understanding of most narratives. Some 
philosophers therefore argue that we should restrict what is storified to the content that an 
informed reader would think that an author—not necessarily the actual author, but a fictional 
or ideal version of the author constructed in interpretation—believed [Currie 1990: ch. 2], 
intended readers to imagine [Byrne 1993], or intended to be part of the story [Phillips 1999]. 
The thought is that our comprehension of stories is much like our comprehension of other 
forms of communication, wherein we seek to understand what someone else aims to get 
across. 
The communicative approach is unsatisfactory, however. First, it is difficult in 
advance to determine which truths might contribute to the appreciation of a work. For 
example, Voltaire describes the aftermath of the (real) Lisbon earthquake of 1755 in Candide, 
where it provides one of many counterexamples to the thesis that this is the best of all 
possible worlds. That the Lisbon earthquake was followed by more damaging earthquakes in 
later centuries may well be relevant to our evaluation of Voltaire’s argument. But even a 
plausibly reconstructed Voltaire could not have believed or intended anything to do with later 
earthquakes. Second, restricting what is storified to what could have been intended closes off 
interpretive options that should not be closed off by a philosophical account of story-truth. 
Take the attitude of the (implied) author of Huckleberry Finn to the escaped slave Jim. The 
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ironic distance from the unreliable narrator is clear; Huck’s belief that he sins by helping Jim 
is not shared. Yet many aspects of Jim’s portrayal remain stereotypical. At the end of the 
novel, he is depicted as a comic figure straight out of a minstrel show. Readers today may 
reject this image, not laughing (as apparently intended) along with Twain’s original audience, 
but instead imagining Jim as suffering underneath. Such an interpretation should not 
automatically be excluded.  
We should therefore reject attempts to restrict the story-truths to a narrower class than 
those determined by the Reality Assumption. That it is strange to report certain story-truths, 
such as that the Higgs boson is responsible for the mass of particles in Candide or Decline 
and Fall, can easily be explained by our purposes in talking about stories. Our usual aim is to 
describe the situations and events that contribute most directly to the plot, those that are 
foregrounded rather than the multitude of backgrounded story-truths. The foregrounded 
story-truths are those that enhance understanding and appreciation of the work: these are the 
ones we are prescribed to imagine.  
This observation prompts another objection, namely that adopting the Reality 
Assumption renders the notion of story-truth irrelevant to any interesting questions about 
literature.
19
 There is a distinction between the story-truths as defined here and what is in an 
intuitive sense ‘part of the story’, and it is only the latter we care about.20 I do not disagree. 
However, the difficulty lies not with the Reality Assumption, but with the notion of story-
truth itself. We need not think that contemplation of Lemuel Gulliver’s internal organs is 
significant to appreciation to recognize that he has them; denying that he does would be 
perverse. The same applies to many of the examples that standardly appear in philosophical 
discussions of fictional truth. When Lewis [1983: 268] points out that Sherlock Holmes does 
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 This objection is due to Richard Woodward. 
20
 Paisley Livingston [1993] helpfully draws this distinction.  
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not have a third nostril and has never visited the moons of Saturn, he is not claiming that 
these story-truths matter to our appreciation of Conan Doyle’s tales.  
If we want to circumscribe a narrower domain of relevant story-truths, we should not 
reject the Reality Assumption. Instead we should limit how we apply the test for invitations 
to imagine. First, we can restrict the circumstances in which we raise the question of whether 
or not a particular proposition is storified to cases where we are attempting to understand 
some feature of the work, thereby excluding idle speculation—or philosophical arguments. In 
interpreting Hamlet’s state of mind, questions about the causes and symptoms of depression 
are appropriate, whereas questions about stars in a nebula are (probably) not. If the latter 
questions are not permitted to arise, facts about nebulae will not be treated as relevant. 
Second, we can place constraints on when we must choose between imagining that P and 
imagining that not-P. Perhaps we are required to choose only when the decision has 
implications for other interpretive issues. The Higgs boson example is a case in point: 
denying that the basic laws of physics apply in Candide would dramatically change the genre. 
Assuming that no such consequence would follow if one denied that Emma Hamilton had N 
hairs on her head, we may exclude consideration of her hair in focusing on what is relevant. 
Although these restrictions make perfect sense, it is difficult in the abstract to say which 
truths will contribute to appreciation and therefore arbitrary to limit what is storified.  
I conclude that the objections do not undermine the Reality Assumption. We have 
good reason to take it to specify a default position in interpretation. Not only do readers adopt 
the Reality Assumption in practice, no other way of supplying the background to a fiction has 
the same scope.  
This conclusion raises an intriguing question: what explains the default status of the 
Reality Assumption? The simplest explanation is that in reading we take works of fiction, 
like works of non-fiction, to be about the real world—even if they invite us to imagine the 
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world to be different from how it actually is. As already noted, imagining a storyworld does 
not mean directing one’s imagining toward something other than the real world; it is instead a 
mental activity that involves constructing a complex representation of what a story portrays. 
So the fact that we imagine storyworlds provides no motivation for severing fiction from 
reality. Indeed the motivation is all on the other side. If works of fiction do not concern 
reality, we must face serious puzzles about how we learn from fictions and why we care 
about the characters that populate them. Rather than try to bridge that gap, I propose that we 
deny its existence. If fictions are about the real world, the question is rather why imagining 
our world in different ways can engage and enlighten us. This is a far more fruitful question 
to pursue.
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